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I.
INTRODUCTION
At any early age, my parents taught me the Golden Rule, “treat
others the way you would like to be treated.” Around the same time,
I learned another popular idiom, “put yourself in someone else’s
shoes.” The latter idiom attempts to teach its audience the importance of empathy. It reminds the listener that one’s first impression of, or reaction to, a situation may not be correct. To fully evaluate the situation, the phrase asks the listener to try to imagine themselves in the other person’s situation. Only after the listener has done
this, should he or she make a final decision.
This attempt to put oneself in another’s shoes applies in the legal
context as well. For example, finders of fact are sometimes asked to
imagine themselves as a reasonable person—a hypothetical person
who exercises the degree of attention, knowledge, and judgment that
society requires of its members.1 Alternatively, in trademark infringement lawsuits, which use the ordinary consumer standard, the
finder of fact is asked to put themselves in the place of the ordinary
consumer in the marketplace to decide whether or not there is infringement.2 Generally, juries are empowered to make this determination because “[i]t is assumed that twelve men know more of the
common affairs of life than does one man, [and] that they can draw
wiser and safer conclusions from admitted facts thus occurring than
1

Reasonable Person, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 23:58 (5th ed. 2017).
2
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can a single judge.”3 However, judges may occasionally make the
ordinary consumer determination. When deciding an infringement
claim at summary judgment, for example, a judge must place himself or herself in the shoes of the ordinary consumer in the marketplace.
This paper addresses the issues that come with having a judicial
system that allows for trademark infringement lawsuits to be dismissed at the summary judgment stage of proceedings—i.e. balancing the problem of judges adopting an ordinary consumer mindset
with the preservation of judicial resources—and discusses the possible solution of adopting a summary trial procedure similar to Canada’s summary trial. Part II provides background information about
summary judgment on likelihood of confusion in trademark infringement actions in the United States. Part III analyzes the positive
and negative aspects of a judge’s ability to dismiss trademark infringement lawsuits at summary judgment in the United States. Part
IV reviews Canada’s trademark law and two Canadian procedures
for resolving cases before trial: summary judgment and summary
trial. Part V examines whether adopting a procedure like summary
trial in the United States would be a viable solution to the problems
that arise in the United States when dismissing a trademark infringement lawsuit at summary judgment. Part VI offers final thoughts.
II.
BACKGROUND
Courts in the United States evaluate trademark infringement
claims by determining whether the alleged infringing mark is likely
to cause consumer confusion.4 To make this determination, courts
balance multiple factors using a likelihood of confusion test.5 Each
circuit uses its own set of factors, sometimes named after the landmark case from that circuit.6 The number of factors courts consider
varies by circuit and ranges from six to thirteen factors with most
3

Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 135 S. Ct. 907, 911 (2015) (quoting Railroad
Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 664 (1874)).
4
LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLAMAN ON UNFAIR
COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 21:1 (4th ed. 2017).
5
GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 519 (4th ed. 2014).
6
Id. at 30.
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circuits having about eight factors.7 For example, the Second Circuit
balances its eight “Polaroid” Factors, while the Federal Circuit examines its thirteen “DuPont” Factors.8 Although each circuit has its
own test, all the courts follow the same general pattern and include
several common factors.9 Each circuit considers the alleged infringer’s intent, whether actual consumer confusion occurred, and a
variety of “market factors.”10 Such market factors include the similarity of the marks, the similarity of the goods or services, and the
purchasing conditions under which and the buyers to whom the sales
are made (i.e. “impulse” vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing).11
At trial, the fact-finder must examine each factor in light of the
evidence presented and determine whether the factor weighs in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant. Then, it must balance the factors
all together to determine whether the defendant’s use is “likely to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.”12 However, a
mere possibility of confusion is not enough.13 The fact finder must
find probable confusion between the marks.14 The court makes this
determination using an ordinary consumer standard, asking whether
an ordinary purchaser in the marketplace is likely to be confused by
the marks.15
Likelihood of confusion is an issue of fact, not law, at the trial
court level.16 Despite the test’s factual nature, dismissal of an infringement lawsuit is allowed on summary judgment if there is no
genuine issue of material fact on the issue of likelihood of confusion.17 In fact, the summary judgment motion can be a powerful
trademark litigation weapon for either plaintiffs or defendants.18 A
7

MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 23:1; see generally DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 5, at 522-23.
8
DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 5, at 521-23.
9
Id. at 520.
10
Id.
11
Id. at 523.
12
MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 23:1.
13
Id. § 23:3.
14
Id.
15
Id. § 23:58.
16
Id. § 23:67.
17
Id.
18
3 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 8.03 (Matthew
Bender).
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judge may determine that there is no need for a jury trial because the
party alleging infringement has not produced any evidence that
could possibly support a factual finding of likelihood of confusion.19
For example, a defendant can succeed in having the case dismissed
at summary judgment by showing a lack of any genuine issue of
material fact on likelihood of confusion due to a total dissimilarity
of the goods or services involved or due to the complete dissimilarity of the marks.20 Alternatively, a judge may determine that trial is
unnecessary if there is sufficient evidence showing a likelihood of
consumer confusion.21 Although obtaining summary judgment is
difficult for a plaintiff on the issue of likelihood of confusion, it is
not impossible if the facts of liability are clear.22
Motions for summary judgment that are properly supported by
affidavits, exhibits, depositions, etc., can dispose of the entire case
before trial, sparing both time and money.23 However, if the motion
is denied, the adverse party receives the benefit of seeing—albeit in
condensed form—the moving party’s theory of the case and main
proof.24 Thus, the nonmoving party will likely have the ability to
prepare more thoroughly for trial, including preparing a more effective cross-examination.25 Alternatively, the nonmoving party will
likely introduce counter-affidavits and briefly disclose its own theory and proof in an attempt to block summary judgment. These actions will allow the moving party a greater opportunity to prepare
for trial.26 Thus, it is not likely that either party will gain the upper
hand if the motion for summary judgment is denied and the case
proceeds to trial.27
At the appellate level, the majority of the circuit courts of appeal
treat likelihood of confusion as an issue of fact reviewed on appeal
using a “clearly erroneous” standard.28 The Third Circuit, for example, has emphasized that “[t]he question of likelihood of confusion
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 32:120.
Id.
See id. § 32:121.
Id.
GILSON, supra note 18.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 23:73.
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is ultimately one of fact, and we cannot roll up our sleeves and engage in the balancing ourselves.”29 However, three circuits are in the
minority, treating likelihood of confusion as an issue of law reviewed de novo.30 Although the minority circuits treat the trial
court’s underlying evaluation of the likelihood of confusion factors
as an issue of fact reviewed using a clearly erroneous standard, the
circuits treat the weighing and balancing of those factors and the
ultimate conclusion as to confusion as a question of law reviewed
de novo.31 The Sixth Circuit is in the minority of circuits that consider likelihood of confusion to be an issue of law reviewed de
novo.32 In Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. Champions Golf Club, Inc.,
the court emphasized that it applies a clearly erroneous standard to
the trial court’s finding of fact supporting the likelihood of confusion factors but reviews de novo the legal question of whether those
facts constitute a likelihood of confusion.33
Courts holding that likelihood of confusion is a question of fact
often determine, when deciding on motions for summary judgment,
that the likelihood of confusion test poses a genuine material fact
that should be left for trial.34 However, courts may also determine
that no genuine factual dispute exists on the issue of likelihood of
confusion if the court finds that no reasonable jury or factfinder
could make a contrary determination.35 Courts have “an important
authority to monitor the outer limits of substantial similarity within
which a jury is permitted to make the factual determination whether
there is a likelihood of confusion”; and thus, courts may grant motions for summary judgment on likelihood of confusion.36 Factual
disputes solely over a single likelihood of confusion factor will generally not prevent summary judgment unless the factor tilts the entire
balance in favor of such a finding. However, a minority of courts

29
A&H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198, 237
(3d Cir. 2000).
30
MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 23:73.
31
DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 5, at 524.
32
MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 23:73.
33
Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d 1111,
1116 (6th Cir. 1996).
34
GILSON, supra note 18.
35
Id.
36
Id.
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hold that consideration of the similarity of the marks factor alone
may allow the court to grant summary judgment.37
Summary judgment is an integral part of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure because it allows for the “just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”38 However,
some circuit courts of appeal generally disfavor allowing summary
judgment on the question of likelihood of confusion. Other circuits
are more willing to dismiss cases on summary judgment.39 For example, the Ninth Circuit has been the most negative of the circuits
when considering granting summary judgment in a trademark infringement lawsuit.40 The court has often cautioned that “[b]ecause
of the intensely factual nature of trademark disputes, summary judgment is generally disfavored in the trademark arena.”41 In Jada Toys,
Inc. v. Mattel, the Ninth Circuit even held that granting summary
judgment was improper despite the fact that a clear dissimilarity of
the marks was the basis for concluding that there was no genuine
issue of fact as to the likelihood of confusion.42 However, the Ninth
Circuit has on occasion found that summary judgment is appropriate.43
Conversely, the Seventh Circuit has been more liberal than the
Ninth Circuit in granting motions for summary judgment.44 Although the Seventh Circuit has noted that “a motion for summary
judgment in trademark infringement cases must be approached with
great caution,” the court does not require that each of the seven confusion factors weigh in favor of a single party. For example, in
Sorensen v. WD-40 Co., the court upheld a granting of summary

37

Id.
Id.
39
DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 5, at 524.
40
MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 32:120.
41
Id.
42
Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, 518 F.3d 628, 637 (9th Cir. 2008).
43
Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005)
(holding that a finding of summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine
issue of material fact exists); see also Applied Info. Sciences Corp. v. EBay, Inc.,
511 F. 3d 966, 966 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that summary judgment is proper
where the registrant failed to provide any admissible evidence tending to show a
likelihood of confusion).
44
See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 32:120.
38
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judgment despite some of the likelihood of confusion factors supporting a finding of a likelihood of confusion where the three most
important factors (similarity of the marks, bad faith intent, and evidence of actual confusion) weighed in favor of the defendant.45
The Supreme Court has yet to address whether likelihood of confusion can be resolved at summary judgment. However, it discussed
a similar issue in Hana Financial, Inc. v. Hana Bank.46 There, the
Court found that the trademark issue of tacking—which uses the
same ordinary consumer standard as likelihood of confusion—
should be left to the jury.47 However, the Court emphasized that “[i]f
the facts warrant it, a judge may decide a tacking question on a motion for summary judgment.”48 Ultimately, the Court in Hana Financial held that when a jury is to be empaneled and when the facts
do not warrant an entry of summary judgment, the jury must decide
whether tacking is warranted.49
III.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF
LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION IN TRADEMARK
INFRINGEMENT LAWSUITS

A.

The “Vulcan mind meld” Problem
A judge must examine the likelihood of confusion factors when
deciding whether or not an infringement lawsuit should be dismissed on summary judgment.50 Often, the judge identifies and discusses evidence relevant to each individual factor and then draws a
conclusion as to whether that factor weighs in favor of a likelihood
of confusion between the two marks.51 Then, the judge uses his or
her findings from each individual factor to examine the likelihood
of confusion test as a whole, determining whether sufficient evidence was presented for the lawsuit to survive summary judgment.52
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Sorensen v. WD-40 Co., 792 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2015).
Hana Fin., Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 907.
Id. at 909.
Id. at 911.
Id. at 913.
See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 23:1.
Id. § 32:120.
Id.
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Judges perform the likelihood of confusion inquiry from the perspective of the ordinary consumer in the marketplace.53
William E. Gallagher and Ronald C. Goodstein question a
judge’s ability to imagine themselves as an ordinary consumer,
likening the attempt to a work of science-fiction by labeling it the
“Vulcan mind meld.”54 The term comes from the ability of Star
Trek’s Vulcan character, Mr. Spock, to touch someone’s head with
his fingertips and experience that person’s thoughts as if they were
his own.55 Gallagher and Goodstein caution that “[t]he proposition
that a human being can perform a ‘Vulcan mind meld’ with relevant
consumers in the marketplace is, like the term, fiction.”56 This fictional proposition is especially relevant at summary judgment because when a judge uses the “Vulcan mind meld” to decide likelihood of confusion, he or she ultimately determines whether or not a
lawsuit can move forward.
Gallagher and Goodstein caution that judges should not assume
themselves to be fairly representative of the class of relevant consumers.57 Because the judge applying the likelihood of confusion
factors is also a consumer, he or she likely has his own subjective
preferences.58 However, these preferences are often entirely irrelevant to a proper confusion analysis59 because it is unlikely that a
judge can share the same thoughts and impressions as the ordinary
consumer in the marketplace.60 If, as is often the case, the judge trying a particular lawsuit is more educated and affluent than the ordinary consumer, the judge’s subjective impression may differ from
that of the ordinary consumer in the marketplace.61 Take the perceived purchase risk of a product—which is subjective in nature—
as an example. An educated and affluent judge may have the sub-

53

See id. § 23:91.
William E. Gallagher & Ronald C. Goodstein, Inference Versus Speculation in Trademark Infringement Litigation: Abandoning the Vulcan Mind Meld,
94 TMR 1229, 1232 (2004).
55
Id. at 1229.
56
Id. at 1232.
57
Id.
58
DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 5, at 525.
59
Id.
60
Gallagher & Goodstein, supra note 54, at 1229.
61
Id. at 1232.
54
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jective impression that a consumer’s decision to purchase a particular product is routine or inconsequential, while the ordinary consumer may associate a material level of financial risk with the same
purchase.62
Further, the situation that judges address in litigation is necessarily substantially different from the ordinary consumer’s experience in the marketplace.63 Consumers have naturally acquired
knowledge, experience, and motivations; have no mission to look
for or experience confusion; and experience actual marketplace circumstances.64 In contrast, judges are artificially focused on infringement during litigation.65 Not only do judges have knowledge of the
identities of the parties, the marks, and the products, but their main
job in infringement litigation is to examine evidence that might support an inference of likelihood of confusion.66 Further, judges generally consider only secondhand evidence of marketplace situations.67 All of these factors taken together may result in judges placing undue emphasis on facts taken out of the actual marketplace context.68
Finally, judges are sometimes asked to imagine themselves as
an ordinary consumer in a class of which they are not—and will
never be—a member. In Triangle Publications Inc. v. Rohrlich, the
trial judge examined whether teenage girls would be likely to confuse plaintiff’s mark, “Seventeen,” for magazines with the defendant’s mark, “Miss Seventeen,” for girdles.69 In his dissent, Judge
Frank criticized the trial judge’s “shaky kind of guess” that the ordinary female teenage consumer was likely to be confused by the
two marks.70 He suggested that courts should obtain information
about the likelihood of confusion between the marks from the ordinary consumers themselves.71 Judge Frank went so far as to question
adolescent girls, their mothers, and their sisters as to whether or not
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

Id.
Id. at 1231.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1231.
Id.
Id.
DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 5, at 525.
Triangle Publications v. Rohrlich, 167 F. 2d 969, 976 (2d Cir. 1948).
Id.
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confusion was likely between “Seventeen” magazine and “Miss
Seventeen” girdles.72
Gallagher and Goodstein offer a similar solution to Judge Frank.
They propose using consumer research to inform the conclusion on
likelihood of confusion.73 Gallagher and Goodstein suggest that surveys about consumer perception and responses should be deemed
important, and in some cases necessary, for plaintiffs to prevail on a
trademark infringement claim.74 Confusion surveys may provide
finders of fact with evidence of actual confusion sufficient to support a finding of likelihood of confusion.75 These surveys measure
whether consumers believe that the senior user is the source of the
alleged infringer’s product or whether it sponsors or approves of that
product.76
At first glance, survey evidence appears to be a viable solution
to the “Vulcan mind meld” problem. However, survey use can present additional problems depending on the viability of the survey.77
Some courts have found issue with the survey population, requiring
that the universe tested by the survey be representative of the appropriate consuming public.78 The appropriate consuming public is
generally defined as potential purchasers of the infringer’s products.79 Additionally, if the survey questions are phrased in a misleading manner or the pool of respondents is not appropriate given
the circumstances of the lawsuit, the survey results will likely be
misleading.80 This misleading information is particularly problematic at summary judgment, where a judge’s reliance on a misleading
survey could prevent a party from being able to try its case.

72

Id. at 977.
Gallagher & Goodstein, supra note 54, at 1235.
74
Id.
75
GILSON, supra note 18.
76
Id.
77
See generally Daniel A. Klein, Admissibility and weight of consumer survey in litigation under trademark opposition, trademark infringement, and false
designation of origin provisions of Lanham Act (15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1063, 1114, and
1125), 98 A.L.R. FED. 20 (1990).
78
GILSON, supra note 18.
79
Id.
80
See id.
73
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B. Assessing the Similarity of the Marks Factor: A Balancing
Act Between the Preservation of Judicial Resources and the
Need for the Ordinary Consumer Fact Finder
The increasing use of summary judgment is one factor causing
fewer and fewer cases to reach trial in federal courts.81 Dismissing
a case on summary judgment allows courts to preserve judicial resources by preventing a case, in which there is no genuine issue of
material fact, from going to trial.82 Because the similarity of the
marks factor is “by far the most influential” in the likelihood of confusion analysis,83 it may be tempting for a judge who perceives the
marks to be dissimilar to determine that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and to dismiss the lawsuit on summary judgment. On
one hand, by dismissing the aforementioned case, the court does not
waste judicial resources trying a case in which there is no genuine
issue of material fact; and thus, the outcome is already certain. On
the other hand, dismissing a case because the judge believes the
marks to be dissimilar does not take into account a variety of other
factors, including the risks of side-by-side comparison, using the
real-world purchasing context, and the danger of the judge’s subjective beliefs entering the decision.
i. Side-by-Side Analyses in Top Tobacco and Malletier
In the Seventh Circuit case, Top Tobacco, L.P. v. North Atlantic
Operating Co., Inc., Judge Easterbrook concluded that it was “next
to impossible to believe that any consumer, however careless, would
confuse the products.”84 He found that summary judgment was appropriate because the marks were so dissimilar that no consumer
could be confused as to who made the respective products.85 Judge
Easterbrook’s analysis of the likelihood of confusion factors ended
after the similarity of the marks inquiry.86 “If we know for sure that

81

MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 32:113.
See generally id.
83
Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark
Infringement, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 1581, 1600 (2006).
84
Top Tobacco, L.P. v. N. Atl. Operating Co., Inc., 509 F. 3d 380, 383 (7th
Cir. 2007).
85
Id.
86
Id.
82
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consumers are not confused about a product’s origin,” Judge Easterbrook emphasized, “there is no need to consult even a single [factor].”87 Thus, Judge Easterbrook proposed that “knowing for sure”
allows a judge to bypass the likelihood of confusion factors.88 This
analysis begs the following question: how can a judge “know for
sure” that no consumer confusion exists? Judge Easterbrook recognized in the Top Tobacco opinion that judges “may misunderstand
how trade dress affects purchasing decisions.”89
Absolute knowledge is a high standard—and a high standard
should be required when dismissing a trademark infringement lawsuit before an ordinary consumer factfinder has a chance to evaluate
the case. Moreover, the similarity of the marks factor is complex.90
When examining the similarity of marks factor, the court must do
more than view the marks side-by-side in the courtroom.91 It must
attempt to simulate the ordinary consumer’s encounter with the
mark in the real world and then assess the similarity of the marks
with that context in mind.92 The marketplace in Top Tobacco involved the two consumer goods sitting next to each other on a store
shelf.93 However, that is not always the case in infringement actions.
Sometimes, the average consumer in the marketplace does not have
the luxury of viewing the marks side-by-side.94
In Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corporation, a trade dress case, the Second Circuit warned
against using side-by-side similarity comparisons to analyze likelihood of confusion.95 The plaintiff sold a line of multicolored handbags through its Louis Vuitton stores and at upscale department
stores with selling prices ranging between $400 and $4,000, while

87

Id.
Id.
89
Id.
90
DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 5, at 544.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
See Top Tobacco, L.P., 509 F.3d at 380.
94
See Malletier v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp., 426 F.3d 532,
534 (2d. Cir. 2005) (vacating the district court’s denial of plaintiff’s motion for
injunctive relief).
95
Id.
88
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the defendant sold a line of multicolored handbags through its discount retail stores at the price of $29.98 per bag.96 The plaintiff
claimed that the defendant’s trade dress was likely to cause both initial interest confusion (i.e., the purchaser is initially drawn to the
handbag because they confuse the origin of defendant’s bag with
plaintiff’s handbags97) and post-sale confusion (i.e., someone other
than the purchaser—chiefly potential purchasers—will see the defendant’s bag and mistakenly relate it to the plaintiff’s handbags98).99
In Malletier, the ordinary consumer in the marketplace would
not simultaneously view the defendant’s and the plaintiff’s handbags.100 The court emphasized that “the Lanham Act requires a court
to analyze the similarity of the products in light of the way in which
the marks are actually displayed in their purchasing context.”101 It is
true that two products may be easily differentiated when carefully
viewed side-by-side.102 However, those same products may still be
confusingly similar in the eyes of ordinary consumers who encounter the products separately under typical purchasing conditions.103 It
is precisely that “real-world” confusion that the Lanham Act seeks
to eliminate.104 Thus, the Malletier court found side-by-side viewing
to be inappropriate when it is isolated viewing that is at issue in the
marketplace.105
Although it may be tempting for a judge to attempt to preserve
judicial resources by dismissing an infringement lawsuit at summary
judgment when the marks appear to be entirely dissimilar, it is not
always proper to do so. A judge must ensure that he or she considers
the marks in the real-world purchasing context—which is not always side-by-side—because to do otherwise “frustrates (however
unintentionally) Congress’s intent.”106
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106

DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 5, at 544.
See generally GILSON, supra note 18, § 5.14.
See generally id.
DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 5, at 544.
See Malletier, 426 F.3d at 539.
Id. at 538.
Id. at 539.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 538.
Malletier, 426 F.3d at 539.
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ii. Jada on the Danger of Elevating a Judge’s Subjective
Beliefs over other Relevant Evidence
Finally, in Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., the Ninth Circuit
warned against treating any one factor as dispositive to the ultimate
question of likelihood of confusion.107 The Jada court held that the
dissimilarity of the marks alone does not absolve the need to inquire
into evidence of other likelihood of confusion factors.108 The court
emphasized that holding otherwise would allow the possibility that
persuasive evidence of one particular factor—dissimilarity of the
marks—be considered at the expense of relevant evidence of other
factors.109 Giving courts the ability to rely on the dissimilarity of the
marks factor alone to conclude that no likelihood of confusion exists
would create the potential for a judge to elevate his or her own subjective impressions of the relative dissimilarity of the marks over
evidence of, for example, actual consumer confusion.110 The likelihood of confusion test would be undermined if the subjective impressions of a particular judge were weighed at the expense of other
relevant evidence.111 Thus, although it may be tempting for a judge
to conserve judicial resources by dismissing a trademark infringement lawsuit because he or she perceives the marks to be dissimilar,
to do so would be improper.112
C. Why Judges Should Have the Authority to Decide Trademark
Infringement Cases at Summary Judgment
Preventing judges from dismissing trademark infringement actions at summary judgment on likelihood of confusion would place
an undue monetary burden on defendants and open the floodgates to
infringement litigation. Summary judgment provides a quick and inexpensive opportunity for parties to dispose of a case in which there
are no real issues of fact that call for trial.113 Summary judgment
also raises the costs and risks associated with the pretrial phases of

107
108
109
110
111
112
113

Jada Toys, Inc., 518 F. 3d at 633.
Id. at 634.
Id. at 633.
Id.
Id.
See generally id.
MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 32:113.
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litigation for plaintiffs.114 Summary judgment effectively serves as
a screening mechanism to prevent plaintiffs from bringing frivolous
lawsuits because such lawsuits are unlikely to survive summary
judgment.115 It follows that eliminating summary judgment as a
screening mechanism will allow for an increase in frivolous claims,
opening the floodgates to litigation.116 By definition, frivolous lawsuits are cases filed with the intention to extort a settlement payment
from a defendant by threatening a costly legal battle.117 An increase
in frivolous lawsuits therefore places an unjust monetary burden on
defendants, the targets of these lawsuits.118 Thus, judges should
maintain the authority to decide infringement cases on likelihood of
confusion at summary judgment because preventing plaintiffs from
bringing frivolous lawsuits preserves judicial resources and avoids
placing an undue monetary burden on defendants.
D.

Finding Guidance in Hana Financial v. Hana Bank
The Supreme Court has not yet considered whether it is proper
to determine likelihood of confusion at summary judgment in a
trademark infringement lawsuit. However, the Supreme Court did
recently address a similar issue—whether a judge or a jury should
determine the outcome of a case on the trademark issue of tacking—
in Hana Financial.119 Like the likelihood of confusion test in trademark infringement actions, tacking is also analyzed from the perspective of an ordinary consumer.120 In Hana Financial, the Supreme Court held that because the tacking inquiry operates under an
ordinary consumer standard, a jury should make the determination.121 In the Hana Financial opinion, Justice Sotomayor acknowledged that the court has long recognized across a variety of doctrinal
contexts that when the relevant question is how an ordinary person
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or community would make an assessment, the jury is generally the
decision maker that should provide the fact-intensive answer.122
Justice Sotomayor’s Hana Financial opinion employs strong
language to advocate that ordinary consumer analyses be made by
juries. However, the unanimous opinion goes on to find that a judge
may decide a tacking question on a motion for summary judgment
when the facts warrant it.123 The court in Hana Financial ultimately
held that “when a jury trial has been requested and when the facts
do not warrant entry of summary judgment . . . the question whether
tacking is warranted must be decided by a jury.”124
Ultimately, the Hana Financial opinion is instructive in a trademark infringement context because both tacking and infringement
use an ordinary consumer standard in their respective analyses. Despite the ordinary consumer standard lending itself to being a question for the jury to determine, the Supreme Court held in Hana Financial that the trademark issue of tacking can be resolved at summary judgment when the facts warrant it.125 It follows that the Supreme Court would be likely to similarly find that when the facts
warrant it, the trademark issue of infringement can be resolved at
summary judgment. Thus, the Supreme Court is unlikely to create a
bright-line rule that judges should not decide likelihood of confusion
at summary judgment. Therefore, in order to solve the issues raised
by deciding likelihood of confusion at summary judgment—the
“Vulcan mind meld” problem, the risk of side-by-side comparison,
the need to evaluate the real-world marketplace context, etc., —
other avenues must be explored.
IV.

TURNING TO CANADIAN LAW FOR A POTENTIAL
SOLUTION
Trademark law in the United States and Canada share various
common aspects. Like the United States, Canada provides legal protection to both registered and unregistered trademarks through the
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Trade-marks Act and at common law.126 Both the United States and
Canada determine whether a mark is infringing on another trademark by examining likelihood of confusion factors, which include
the similarity of the marks and the intent of the allegedly infringing
mark holder.127 Further, the confusion analysis is determined using
an average consumer standard in both the United States and Canada.128 One notable difference between trademark actions in the
United States and Canada is that, in Canada, trademark infringement
trials are conducted by a judge without a jury.129 Conversely, trademark infringement trials in the United States are generally tried by
a judge with a jury.130 The following section examines Canada’s
treatment of trademark infringement actions at the summary proceedings stage for a potential solution to the foregoing problems presented at summary judgment in infringement actions in the United
States.
A.

Trademark Infringement in Canada
Canada’s Trade-marks Act allows an action to be brought for
trademark infringement.131 Trademark infringement actions are typically brought before the Federal Court of Canada.132 However, actions for infringement may also be brought in the Provincial court.133
A Federal Court decision has effect throughout Canada, while a Provincial Court decision only has effect in that province.134 In Canada,
a trademark infringement trial is conducted by a judge without a
jury.135 The trial consists of the testimony of live witnesses, although
expert evidence may also be introduced by affidavit.136 Survey evidence is also commonly introduced at trial to determine whether the
126
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marks are confusingly similar.137 However, to be admissible, the
survey evidence must be fair and unbiased, conducted by a qualified
expert, cover an issue outside the experience of the judge, and usually may not be confined to a limited geographical area.138 Admissible survey evidence can be accorded great weight by the courts.139
Parties may also obtain preliminary injunctions in trademark infringement lawsuits.140 However, to obtain a preliminary injunction,
a party must show that there is a serious issue to be tried, that the
plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction,
and that the balance of convenience is in the plaintiff’s favor.141
A registered trademark holder has the exclusive right to use the
mark. This right is infringed by any person who, without authorization, sells, distributes, or advertises goods or services in association
with a confusingly similar trademark.142 A trademark is confusingly
similar to another trademark if the use of both trademarks in the
same area would likely lead to the inference that the products associated with such trademarks are made by the same person.143 Canadian courts should consider all surrounding circumstances when determining whether two trademarks are confusingly similar.144 The
Trade-marks Act provides the court with a list of factors to consider
in determining whether trademarks are similar, including the inherent distinctiveness of the marks and the extent to which the marks
are known, the length of time the marks have been in use, the nature
of the products, the nature of the trade, and the degree of similarity
between the marks.145 Canadian courts should also consider the intent of the allegedly infringing mark holder.146 Whether or not a
mark is famous is not a specifically enumerated factor, however, it
is implicit in three of the factors provided in the Trade-marks Act—
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the inherent distinctiveness, the extent to which the mark has become known, and the length of time that it has been used.147
Canada’s Federal Court of Appeals has set four standards to analyze the likelihood of confusion.148 First, courts must use the imperfect recollection test to determine the similarity of the marks.149
This test is similar to the ordinary consumer standard in the United
States in that it requires the court to consider the average, “somewhat-hurried”150 consumer’s imperfect recollection when analyzing
the likelihood of confusion.151 Canada’s imperfect recollection test
finds that it is improper to do a side-by-side comparison of the
marks. The marks should not be subjected to careful side-by-side
analysis because the court must instead attempt to put itself in the
position of the average consumer—a person who has only a general
and not a precise recollection of the earlier mark and then sees the
later mark by itself.152 If the court finds that the average consumer
is likely to believe that the later mark’s product is made by the earlier mark’s brand (of which the consumer “has only such a recollection”), the court may properly conclude that the marks are similar.153
Second, the marks must be considered in their entirety.154 The nature
of the goods associated with the mark must also be considered.155
Finally, the court must consider the degree of resemblance of the
appearance, sound, and ideas suggested.156
When the court finds that trademark infringement is present, it
may issue an injunction.157 The court also has the authority to order
that any infringing goods, packages, labels, and advertising material
be destroyed.158 The court can also order the recovery of either the
damages sustained as a result of the infringement or an accounting
of the infringer’s profits attributable to the infringement, but not
147
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both.159 To award both damages and profits would allow the plaintiff
double recovery.160 However, the court may additionally award litigation costs to the successful party in a trademark infringement action. Finally, in some cases, the court may award punitive damages.161
B. Summary Proceedings in Canada: The 2009 Amendment to
the Federal Court Rules
Canada’s Federal Court Rules allow for two types of summary
proceedings prior to trial, summary judgment and summary trial.162
In 2009, Canada amended its Federal Court Rules to modify the existing rules on summary judgment and to include a summary trial
procedure.163 Prior to the 2009 amendment, the judicial interpretation of the summary judgment rule limited the instances in which
summary judgment could be granted.164 The prior jurisprudence required that motions for summary judgment be dismissed when there
was an issue of credibility or conflicting evidence and the outcome
of the motion turned on the drawing of inferences.165
The 2009 amendment recognized and sought to correct a deficiency in the prior summary judgment provisions’ ability to “provide the flexibility needed to manage the Federal Court’s caseload
efficiently by the expeditious disposition of cases that do not require
a full trial.”166 The summary trial procedure included in the 2009
amendment was modeled after a similar procedure found in the British Columbia Rules of Court. Including a summary trial procedure
allows for the court to dispose summarily of actions in a greater
range of circumstances than was permitted under the previous
rules.167
Thus, the 2009 amendment to Canada’s Federal Court Rules
modified the summary judgment rules and added a summary trial
159
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procedure, in part, to preserve judicial resources.168 This is because
Canada’s civil justice system is “premised upon the value that the
adjudication process must be fair and just.”169 A fair and just result
cannot be achieved when the process is disproportionate to the nature of the dispute and the interests involved.170
In Hryniak v. Mauldin, the Supreme Court of Canada called for
a shift in the culture of Canada’s civil justice system.171 The court
emphasized that the proportionality principle—which says that the
best forum for resolving a dispute is not always that with the most
painstaking procedure—can act as a touchstone for access to civil
justice.172 For example, the court highlighted that protracted trials,
with unnecessary expense and delay, can prevent the fair and just
resolution of disputes.173
The 2009 amendment also sought to give parties more control
over the pace of their litigation.174 The inclusion of a summary trial
procedure enabled the court to determine an issue or action through
summary trial even when conflicting evidence or issues of credibility are present, which would have required a full trial prior to the
2009 amendment.175 By expanding the number of instances in which
an action could be disposed of summarily through the means of summary trial, the 2009 amendment provided greater flexibility to the
parties to litigation and to the court, while enhancing access to justice.176
C. The Procedure of Summary Judgment and Summary Trial in
Canada
In Canada, a party may bring a motion for summary judgment
or a motion for summary trial on all or some of the issues raised in
the pleadings at any time after the defendant has filed a defense, but
before trial has been scheduled.177 Canadian trademark infringement
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actions may be decided at summary judgment178 or summary trial.179
Parties to intellectual property actions in Canada may also jointly
agree to proceed by way of summary trial, rather than spending time
and money preparing for and having a full trial.180 However, once a
party moves for summary judgment or summary trial, the party may
not bring a further motion for either summary judgment or summary
trial unless the party receives permission from the court.181 As a general principle, the court must interpret and apply the rules governing
summary judgment and summary trial “so as to secure the just, most
expeditious and least expensive determination of every proceeding
on its merits.”182
i. Summary Judgment
In Canada, summary judgment is available because it allows for
the efficient disposition of actions, in whole or in part, where conducting a trial to hear a full range of evidence is unnecessary.183
Courts may grant motions for summary judgment when there is no
genuine issue for trial.184 A motion for summary judgment must be
based solely on the evidence offered by the parties in their motion
records.185 A response to a motion for summary judgment cannot
rely on what might be adduced as evidence at a later stage in the
proceedings.186 Rather, it must provide specific facts and offer the
evidence showing that there is no genuine issue for trial.187
If the court is satisfied that there is no genuine issue for trial with
respect to a claim or defense on a motion for summary judgment,
the court must grant summary judgment.188 However, if the court
finds that there is a genuine issue of fact or law for trial, the court
178
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may “nevertheless determine that issue by way of summary trial and
make any order necessary for the conduct of the summary trial;
or . . . dismiss the motion in whole or in part and order that the action, or the issues in the action not disposed of by summary judgment, proceed to trial or that the action be conducted as a specially
managed proceeding.”189
ii. Summary Trial
The summary trial procedure allows the court to determine an
issue or action even if there is conflicting evidence or if issues of
credibility are present.190 The motion record for a summary trial
must contain all of the evidence a party wishes to rely upon, including affidavits, admissions, affidavits or statements of an expert witness, and other admissible evidence.191 The court is permitted to
draw an adverse inference if a party fails to file responding or rebuttal evidence.192 After a party moves for summary trial, no further
affidavits or statements may be served unless the party received permission from the court.193 However, in the case of the moving party,
there is also an exception if the content of the affidavit or statement
is limited to evidence that would be admissible at trial as rebuttal
evidence.194 Further, the court has authority at summary trial to
make any order required for the conduct of the summary trial.195
This includes the authority to issue orders requiring a deponent or
an expert who has given a statement to be cross-examined live before the court at the summary trial proceeding.196 Finally, the court
may draw an adverse inference at summary trial if a party fails to
cross-examine on an affidavit.197
The court must dismiss a motion for summary trial if “the issues
raised are not suitable for summary trial” or if “summary trial would
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not assist in the efficient resolution of the action.”198 The party seeking summary trial has the burden to prove that a summary trial is
appropriate.199 A judge evaluates the following factors to determine
whether a case is appropriate for summary trial: the amount of
money involved, the complexity of the matter, the urgency of the
matter, any prejudice delay may cause, comparing the cost of taking
the case to a full trial to the amount of money involved, whether the
case requires an extensive trial, whether the credibility of witnesses
is critical in the case, whether summary trial will be a waste of time,
whether summary trial will cause the action to be divided into separate trials, and any other relevant issue.200
Once a motion for summary trial is before the court, the party
making an assertion has the burden to prove that assertion using relevant evidence and applying appropriate law.201 If the court dismisses a motion for summary trial, the court may order the action
(or issues within the action that were not disposed of by summary
trial) to proceed to trial.202 Alternatively, the court may grant judgment either generally or on an issue if the court is satisfied that there
is sufficient evidence for adjudication, unless the court finds that it
would be unjust to decide the issues on the motion for summary
trial,203 regardless of complexity or conflicting evidence.204 When
granting judgment on a motion for summary trial, the court may
make any order necessary for the disposition of the action, including
an order directing a trial to determine the amount of money to which
the moving party is entitled, imposing terms regarding enforcement
of the judgment, and awarding costs.205
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V. SHOULD THE UNITED STATES ADOPT A SUMMARY
PROCEEDING SIMILAR TO CANADA’S SUMMARY
TRIAL?
The Supreme Court’s holding in Hana Financial— “when a jury
trial has been requested and when the facts do not warrant entry of
summary judgment . . . the question whether tacking is warranted
must be decided by a jury”—suggests that the Supreme Court will
not create a bright-line rule eliminating summary judgment on the
likelihood of confusion in trademark infringement claims.206 Not
adopting said bright-line rule benefits courts and defendants alike
because summary judgment acts as a screen that prevents frivolous
lawsuits, which cost both courts and defendants time and money to
manage.207 However, the availability of summary judgment as an
option for disposing of an infringement claim poses various problems. First, it is nearly impossible for a judge to perform the “Vulcan
mind meld” required to become an ordinary consumer in the likelihood of confusion analysis.208 Further, judges should exercise caution when examining the similarity of the marks factor to ensure that
their analysis of the similarity of the marks considers the real-world
purchasing context and does not elevate their own subjective beliefs
over other evidence.209 Canada’s summary trial procedure offers a
suitable solution to the foregoing issues.
A.

Why Summary Trial is the Proper Solution
Although it would be beneficial to always have a jury decide the
question of likelihood of confusion, an analysis of the Supreme
Court’s Hana Financial decision provides that eliminating summary
procedure altogether is unlikely. Canada’s summary trial or a similar
procedure—like a formal, binding version of the Alternative Dispute Resolution procedures: summary jury trial and summary bench
trial210—is a desirable alternative to summary judgment. Summary
trial is a better procedural choice than summary judgment in decid-
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ing likelihood of confusion because it offers parties more of an opportunity to litigate their position than summary judgment provides.
Summary trial is also a viable alternative to summary judgment because it preserves judicial resources.
Summary trial should replace summary judgment in likelihood
of confusion actions because summary trial allows parties to more
exhaustively advocate their case. At summary trial, both parties
have the benefit of cross-examining witnesses and experts, which is
not an option at summary judgment.211 The opportunity for crossexamination also benefits the judge, who must decide whether a
likelihood of confusion exists. The judge is able to examine more
evidence on likelihood of confusion at summary trial than he or she
would at summary judgment. This opportunity is beneficial to the
judge who must become the “ordinary consumer” to determine the
likelihood of confusion. For example, a judge may benefit from
hearing the testimony and cross-examination of a witness providing
evidence of actual confusion. Hearing the witness’ personal explanation of confusion may assist the judge in understanding how an
average consumer in the marketplace may be confused by two similar marks. Summary trial also gives parties more control over their
investment in the case because the parties may agree to proceed by
way of summary trial, spending less time and money than they
would if they went to trial.212
Additionally, summary trial is a suitable alternative to summary
judgment because it preserves judicial resources. Like summary
judgment, summary trial preserves judicial resources by disposing
of cases that do not require a full trial, including frivolous claims.213
Thus, summary trial protects against the opening of the floodgates
to frivolous infringement litigation that would normally occur without summary judgment. Further, summary trial preserves judicial
resources more efficiently than summary judgment because summary trial allows the court to dispose summarily of actions in a
greater range of circumstances.214 Parties may also elect to forego
having a full trial and instead choose to have a summary trial, which
preserves judicial resources.
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B. Although Canada’s Summary Trial Does Not Solve the
“Vulcan Mind Meld” Problem, the United States Can Amend
Canada’s Summary Trial to Cure this Issue
Issues at summary trial are decided by a judge rather than a
jury.215 Thus, the judge must still attempt to put themselves in the
place of the ordinary consumer in the marketplace at summary trial
on the likelihood of confusion issue. It follows that adopting a summary trial procedure in the place of summary judgment will not
solve the problems associated with a judge “becoming” the ordinary
consumer. Adopting a summary trial procedure will not cure the inability of a judge to perform a “Vulcan mind meld” into an ordinary
consumer or prevent the risk of the judge’s subjective beliefs entering the decision. Summary trial similarly does not quash the danger
of side-by-side mark comparison or ensure that the real-world purchasing context is used.
Although it is possible that, like judges in the United States, Canadian judges experience similar problems of “becoming” an ordinary consumer, Canada does not have the option to have a jury trial
on a trademark infringement action in federal court.216 Therefore,
there is no opportunity for jurors—who are generally considered average consumers—to resolve the likelihood of confusion question in
Canada. Accordingly, Canada’s summary trial rule was not written
or adopted to resolve any issue with a judge, rather than a jury, becoming an ordinary consumer.
To cure the aforementioned problems associated with summary
trial, the United States should amend Canada’s summary procedures
to fit its needs. Adopting a proceeding similar to Canada’s summary
trial proceeding in trademark infringement actions on the likelihood
of confusion would provide a suitable solution to the current problems faced at summary judgment on likelihood of confusion. In
Canada, parties may move for summary judgment or summary trial
on likelihood of confusion.217
However, parties to trademark infringement actions in the
United States should not be given the ability to resolve likelihood of
confusion at summary judgment or summary trial. Instead, parties
215
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wishing to use a summary proceeding to dispose of an infringement
case on likelihood of confusion should be limited to using summary
trial. If parties have access to both summary judgment and summary
trial as summary proceedings, the issues related to a judge becoming
an ordinary consumer will be exacerbated. That is because none of
the problems surrounding judges becoming ordinary consumers are
resolved by adopting summary trial. Allowing parties to access both
summary judgment and summary trial would give judges more opportunities to decide on likelihood of confusion before juries—the
appropriate finder-of-fact when considering likelihood of confusion—have the ability to analyze the question. Thus, summary trial
should be the sole summary proceeding that parties to trademark infringement actions should have access to on the question of likelihood of confusion.
While summary trial does not directly correct the problem of
judges becoming the ordinary consumer, it is better suited to help
judges think like an ordinary consumer at the summary proceeding
stage than is summary judgment. Judges are able to consider more
evidence at summary trial than they are at summary judgment. In
addition to affidavits, admissions, affidavits or statements of an expert witness, and other admissible evidence, judges are able to consider the testimony and cross-examination of witnesses and experts
at summary trial. Allowing cross-examination of witnesses and experts is a unique feature to summary trial, which is unavailable at
summary judgment. Parties also benefit from having the ability to
cross-examine witnesses and experts at the summary proceeding
stage. Therefore, although summary trial fails to solve judges’ inability to truly transform themselves into the ordinary consumer, it is
better suited to decide the likelihood of confusion question because
it allows judges to consider more evidence in making the likelihood
of confusion determination than summary judgment does.
VI.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, adopting a bright-line rule eliminating summary
judgment on the likelihood of confusion analysis is unlikely due to
the Supreme Court’s holding in Hana Financial and the negative
impact such a rule would have on judicial resources. However, allowing summary judgment on the likelihood of confusion is equally
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as problematic because judges cannot perform a “Vulcan mind
meld” to become an ordinary consumer and may face issues considering marks in the real-world context. Canada’s summary trial procedure offers a solution to these diametrically opposed issues. Although a summary trial proceeding does not prevent the judge from
having to become an ordinary consumer, it preserves judicial resources while also offering parties a better ability to advocate their
case. Thus, with respect to trademark infringement actions on likelihood of confusion, a proceeding similar to summary trial in Canada should be implemented in place of summary judgment.

